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There is probably someone somewhere who would be willing to say
that law is just rules and the techniques of rule manipulation, but in the
academy, if not outside of it, this view has long been out of fashion.1
Today, a description of law as "a dazzlingly complex array of social,
cultural, linguistic, and normative practices" 2 presents itself not as a
revolutionary insight but as a form of common sense. Part of what has
educated us to understand law as a phenomenon richer than the sum of its
rules is the teachings of the various "law ands" that have grown up over the
years-law and economics, law and history, law and society, and the like.
In methodologically diverse ways, "law and" scholarship has consistently
encouraged consideration of law's dependence on and connection to other
t Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law. I thank Richard Baron, Julia Epstein,
and Rick Greenstein for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Essay. I thank Leonore
Carpenter for excellent research assistance. I am especially grateful to Zachary Baron and Ruth
Baron, who provided encouragement and advice at key moments in the development of this
Essay.
This Essay originated in a talk I gave at a colloquium on law and literature held at University
College London in June 1998. I thank Michael Freeman and Andrew Lewis for inviting me to
participate in that conference.
1. Judge Posner assured us over a decade ago that the law had declined as an autonomous
discipline. See Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987,
100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987). Even those such as Judge Edwards, who have criticized legal
scholarship for being insufficiently "practical," have conceded that "abstract theory" and various
"law and" movements all "have the potential to serve important educational functions and,
therefore, should have a permanent home in the law schools." Harry T. Edwards, The Growing
Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34, 34-35
(1992).
2. Janet E. Halley, Notes from the Editorial Advisory Board, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 389,
391 (1998).
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disciplines. "In spite of sharp differences among ['law and'] schools," two
commentators recently observed, "all concur that the legal world is not to
be understood on its own terms, but requires the application of some
method or substance provided by other disciplines." 3
One of the other disciplines that has been offered to provide law with
the necessary understanding is literature. "Law and literature" may not be
the oldest "law and" 4 or the most influential,5 but neither has it played the
shy wallflower at the "law and" dance. Law review symposia,6 books,. and
conferences8 have all explored the ways in which law can be connected to,
and improved by, literature. Literature, it is said, sheds light on law's gaps,
rhetoric, and moral stance. It elucidates law's limits and highlight law's
exclusions. Interpretive methods conventionally applied to fictional texts
can be applied productively to legal texts, and narrative techniques that
draw readers into novels and plays can be employed in the service of legal
arguments.
These are provocative and occasionally startling claims, but it is not
clear whether those outside the law-and-literature community are truly
persuaded. My principal argument in this Essay is that the law-and-
literature movement has failed to generate the excitement that it is capable
- 3. Marc Galanter & Mark Alan Edwards, Introduction: The Path of the Law Ands, 1997 Wis.
L. REV. 375,376.
4. Galanter and Edwards assert that "[1]aw and society and law and economics are the oldest
and most institutionalized of the[] law ands." IL at 376-77 (footnotes omitted). Of course, a great
deal depends on how one characterizes the history of the law-and-literature movement. Arguably,
it originated in 1908, with the publication of John H. Wigmore, A List of Legal Novels, 2 ILL. L.
REV. 574 (1908). The contemporary law-and-literature movement is often traced to the more
recent publication of JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE
OF LEGAL THOUGHT AND ExPRESSION (1973), or to the mid-1980s, when White published two
other highly influential books, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND
RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY (1984) [hereinafter WHrm,
WORDS]; and HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985)
[hereinafter WHrIE, HERACLES' BOW]. For a somewhat idiosyncratic but very thorough account
of the movement's history, see Michael Pantazakos, Ad Humanitatem Pertinent: A Personal
Reflection on the History and Purpose of the Law and Literature Movement, 7 CARDOZO STUD. L.
& LITERATURE 31 (1995).
5. That distinction is almost always accorded to law and economics. See, e.g., Galanter &
Edwards, supra note 3, at 378; see also infra note 9 (comparing law and economics to law and
literature).
6. See, e.g., Law, Literature, and the Humanities, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1994); Symposium,
Law and Literature, 39 MERCER L. REv. 739 (1988); Symposium: Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L.
REV. 373 (1982).
7. In addition to the works of James Boyd White cited supra note 4, see, for example, IAN
WARD, LAW AND LITERATURE: POSSIBILrrIES AND PERSPECTIVES (1995); RICHARD WEISBERG,
POETHICS AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE (1992); and ROBIN WEST,
NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW (1993).
8. I am referring here to a law-and-literature colloquium held from June 29 to June 30, 1998
at University College London. The conference proceedings will be published as LAw AND
LITERATURE (Michael D.A. Freeman & Andrew D.E. Lewis eds., forthcoming June 1999). See
also Daniel J. Kornstein, Introduction to the Volume, 8 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE at ii
(Fall/Winter 1996) (describing a conference on law and literature at the University of California at
Berkeley's Boalt Hall from September 30 to October 2, 1995).
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of generating within the American legal academy because it has not been
sufficiently interdisciplinary, or-to be more precise-it has not been very
thoughtful about interdisciplinarity. 9 At the same time, it has had less
influence than it might have had with actual lawyers because it has seemed
too interdisciplinary, in the sense of not having a lot to say about the aspect
of law with which most lawyers are most concerned: doctrine. There is less
of a paradox here than might appear. Law-and-literature scholarship has not
questioned what the category "law" consists of and has thus tended
inadvertently to reinforce the notion of law as autonomous.
This failing-if it is a failing-is not unusual in "law and" scholarship.
Assessments of how legal academics could or should employ learning from
other fields typically employ a strategy of compare-and-contrast in which
the nature and aims of law are juxtaposed against those of the non-law field
to evaluate whether the latter can be used appropriately in the service of the
former.'0 Because the comparisons tend to treat both "law" and the "and"
discipline as bounded entities, they do not explicitly consider how the
boundaries are drawn. As in the case of law and literature, law tends to be
depicted as a more or less empty domain composed mainly of rules. For all
of the collective success of the "law ands" in challenging the old-fashioned
vision of law as rules, the individual "law ands" have not escaped the spell
of Langdellian orthodoxy. More specifically, they have failed to fulfill the
potential of interdisciplinary scholarship to examine how we categorize
knowledge and why.
Before developing this critique in more detail, I state a separate critique
that may be a helpful backdrop. This background critique is that the law-
9. Proving that law and literature has not in fact generated the excitement it might have is
difficult, for assessing the impact of ideas is tricky work. In America, we are fond of counting
citations, see, e.g., Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1540
(1985); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
751 (1996), but it is not at all clear that qualitative effects are best evaluated by quantitative
measures. Moreover, the pseudo-scientism of citation counting seems inconsistent with a
movement committed to nonmechanical, nonreductionist views of law. If (putting aside obvious
methodological problems of exactly what we ought to count, how we count it, and so on), we
count nonetheless, the results are not very encouraging. To take but one example, in a recent
Westlaw search of law reviews and journals, the term 'law and economics' appeared 6675 times;
the term 'law and literature' appeared 1655 times. Search of Westlaw JLR database (June 1,
1998).
One of law and literature's principal figures, Robin West, has conceded that law and
literature is a "marginal movement" as compared with law and economics. ROBIN WEST, CARING
FOR JUSTICE 180 (1997).
10. This technique is described in Jane B. Baron, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship as
Guilty Pleasure: The Case of Law and Literature, in LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 8
(manuscript at 2). See generally Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in
Law: Reexamining the Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 41 DUKE L.J. 191
(1991) (comparing "the humanities" and law); Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modem
American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 523 (1995) (comparing history and law); Martha
C. Nussbaum, The Use and Abuse of Philosophy in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1627
(1993) (comparing philosophy and law).
106119991
The Yale Law Journal
and-literature movement has tended to undermine itself from within. If
there is a single movement here," it is certainly a very fractured one. The
concerns of its separate strands are quite disparate. Any theme broad
enough to tie all the strands together can be found and stated only at a level
of abstraction so high as to threaten banality; such abstraction also
undercuts what some within the movement regard as a fundamental
commitment to particularity as opposed to grand theory. 2 This is a
movement of many methodologies and conclusions. The multiplicity of
approaches and concerns that leads some to see literature as a source of
nearly endless possibilities may lead skeptics to dismiss law and literature
as an empty vessel, a phrase devoid of content.
The interdisciplinarity critique and the background critique are not
necessarily connected. The background critique basically describes a
problem of internal fragmentation, of mixed and conflicting messages. The
law-and-literature movement could be a great deal more unified and
coherent than I argue it actually is and yet still fail to engage meaningfully
the question of how and why disciplinary boundaries are being drawn in the
way the movement currently draws them.
Still, the critiques may not be wholly unrelated. Each strand of the law-
and-literature movement seeks to demonstrate that literature has something
to offer law. The less attention that is paid to what law is, for purposes of
this comparison, the easier it is to make the case for literature; that is, the
less law already includes, the more obvious it is that it requires the
supplementation of literature. Explicit recognition that the category "law"
might be contingent or created would substantially complicate the
argument. It seems no accident that a movement so invested in a vision of
law as requiring enhancement from something "outside" should be
11. For arguments that there is a single movement, see, for example, GARY MINDA,
POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 149-66
(1995) (providing a chapter on "the law and literature movement"); WEST, supra note 9, at 179
(" [It now makes some sense to speak of the law and literature movement as a recognizable
discipline, or subspecialty with its own set of defining questions and tentative lines of analysis
within the legal academy."). But see John D. Ayer, "Aliens Are Coming! Drain the Pool," 88
MICH. L. REV. 1584, 1585 (1990) (book review) (" [D]espite the increasing currency of the term
[law and literature], no single field of inquiry deserves that name."); Geoffrey P. Miller, A
Rhetoric of Law, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 255 (1985) (book review) (arguing that law and
literature lacks the kind of "organized theoretical structure" of law and economics); iU. at 255-56
(arguing that because "there is no single well-understood and widely accepted theory of
literature," nor "a unifying set of normative values" underlying literary interpretation, there are
"serious questions about whether law and literature provides an adequate conceptual foundation
to support a coherent body of scholarship"); cf. Thomas Morawetz, Ethics and Style: The Lessons
of Literature for Law, 45 STAN. L. REV. 497, 499 (1993) (book review) (suggesting that some
scholars wishing to counteract the perception that "the discipline of law and literature is actually
the intersection of several distinct and barely overlapping concerns" have sought "to validate the
field by identifying a significant core").
12. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, On the Margin: Humanities and Law, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
413,415-17 (1998).
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somewhat careless in its consideration of the boundaries of "law" as a
discipline. Both critiques, then, point to a single problem: By treating law's
boundaries as both necessary and natural, the law-and-literature movement
seems to beg questions it is ostensibly committed to answering, such as
whether it makes sense to use the "outside" discipline of literature as a tool
to examine what is or could be "inside" law-and, more importantly, how
we define what is "internal" and "external" to law as a discipline.
I. THE ELUSIVE CONNECTION BETWEEN LrrERATuRE AND LAW
Unlike college courses, in which professors tend to assign multiple
books and have a supplemental list of "suggested" readings to boot, in
many law school courses, especially in the first year, only one book is
assigned. When I entered law school, I was shocked to learn that the sole
book consisted mainly of cases. One learned law, it seemed, by reading law.
Only law. One did not read about law. One read the law itself. No more,
apparently, was needed.
From the perspective of at least some within the law-and-literature
movement, this "only law" approach is misguided. The movement's
proponents (whom I shall call hereinafter "law-and-lits") argue that law
students, legal academics, and even practicing lawyers should also read
literature. But for what purpose should they read literature? What is it that
literature can add? Unfortunately, there is no consensus on the answer to
this question. Rather, the movement divides into three separate strands.13
A. Divisions Within Law and Literature: Three Strands
Some law-and-lits, whom I shall call "humanist" law-and-lits, argue
that lawyers should read literature. Here are some typical claims:
[L]iterary works typically invite their readers to put themselves in
the place of people of many different kinds and to take on their
experiences.... [T]hey promote identification and sympathy ....
... One may be told many things about people in one's own
society and yet keep that knowledge at a distance. Literary works
that promote identification and emotional reaction cut through
13. Any characterization of the movement's divisions is to some extent arbitrary. For a
slightly different description of the "genres" of law and literature, see Guyora Binder, The Law-
as-Literature Trope, in LAW AND LrrERATURE, supra note 8 (manuscript at 7). As I will argue, a
more conventional approach divides the movement into "law in literature" and "law as
literature." See infra text accompanying notes 65-67. Several leading law-and-literature scholars
organize their discussion around the three strands identified in the text, although they have not
used the identical labels. See, e.g., MINDA, supra note 11, at 153; RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND
LrrERATURE 5-6 (rev. ed. 1998); VEST, supra note 9, at 179.
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those self-protective stratagems, requiring us to see and to respond
to many things that may be difficult to confront .... ,4
[L]iterature projects the abstract into the concrete."5
Literature trains people in the reflection, consciousness, choice, and
responsibility that make up the ability to engage in moral
decisionmaking. It does so by presenting artificial, but concrete,
universes in which premises may be worked out in conditions
conducive to empathy but ambiguous enough to allow for the
formation of moral judgment. 6
Notice that while the claims have slightly different emphases, the basic
argument is the same: Literature is needed to humanize lawyers. Borrowing
from earlier work, 7 I will call this the "moral uplift" theme of the law-and-
literature movement. It has several components: First, lawyers need to
know more about human nature-especially about people different from
themselves-than they can learn on their own, and literature can be a
source of this knowledge. 3 Second, lawyers tend to rely excessively on
abstract reason over forms of understanding that are emotional, intuitive,
and concrete, and literature can help correct this imbalance. 9 Third, lawyers
require training in making moral judgments, and literature can be a part of
the necessary moral education.2"
While humanist law-and-lits argue that lawyers should read literature,
others, whom I shall call "hermeneutic" law-and-lits, argue that lawyers
14. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE
5-6 (1995).
15. Harvey Couch, II, Law and Literature-A Comment, 17 VAND. L. REV. 911, 914 (1964).
16. Linda R. Hirshman, Bront, Bloom, and Bork: An Essay on the Moral Education of
Judges, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 177, 179 (1988).
17. See Jane B. Baron & Julia Epstein, Language and the Law: Literature, Narrative, and
Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 662,664 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
18. See, e.g., Wigmore, supra note 4, at 579 (1908).
19. See, e.g., WAI CHEE DIMOCK, RESIDUES OF JUSTICE: LITERATURE, LAW, PHILOSOPHY
10 (1996) (noting that literature transposes the "clean abstractions" of law "into the messiness of
representation"); Paul Gewirtz, Aeschylus' Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1043, 1050 (1988)
("Literature ... nourishes the kinds of human understanding not achievable through reason alone
but involving intuition and feeling as well. If... law engages nonrational elements and requires
the most comprehensive kinds of understanding, literature can play an important part in a lawyer's
development.").
20. See, e.g., Richard Weisberg, Coming of Age Some More: "Law and Literature" Beyond
the Cradle, 13 NOVA L. REv. 107, 123-24 (1988) ("Pedagogically, I am convinced that literature
is a better medium for lawyers than is, say, moral philosophy, from which to learn about rightness.
It delights as it instructs. It places the inquiry on virtue into a dynamic framework and allows the
reader to reason inductively from the cases described to her own experience and thoughts.").
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should read literary theory. The latter group seeks to apply to law
interpretive methodologies borrowed from literary studies. The reason is
simple. To the extent that law is embodied in texts-such as cases, statutes,
contracts, orders-those texts must be read and interpreted.21 Literary
scholars have concerned themselves with problems of interpretation for a
very long time, and it seems that theories and methods developed in the
context of literary texts could be applied to legal texts as well.2 2 Why, after
all, reinvent the interpretation wheel?
Notice that the project of applying to law interpretive theories
developed in departments of English or comparative literature does not
require that one actually read any poems, novels, or plays-in short, any
literature. While a particular interpretive methodology might have been
developed in the context, say, of reading Hamlet, what makes it a
methodology (as opposed to an interesting way to read Hamlet) is that it
can be applied to other texts as well. So one need not read the play, but only
the methodology. Hermeneutic law-and-lits thus do not argue that lawyers
need to read literature. Indeed, besides looking beyond legal materials to
sources from the humanities, the interpretive project of hermeneutic law-
and-lit has very little connection to the moral uplift project of humanist law-
and-lit. The two strands of law-and-lit are neither reading the same works
nor asking the same questions.'
Further splintering this already very fractured movement is yet another
set of writings that has come to be associated with law and literature:
writings taking up the role of narrative or storytelling in law.24 These
21. See, e.g., Mark Kingwell, Let's Ask Again: Is Law Like Literature?, 6 YALE J.L. &
HuMAN. 317, 351 (1994) ("Law is utterly like literature because it consists of written texts that
are subject to interpretation. To the extent that a general theory of interpretation is valid... law
and literature are two instances of the same human activity: divining meaning from written
artifacts."); see also Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, in INTERPRETING LAW AND
LrERATURE: A HERmENEuTic READER 155, 157 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds.,
1988) ("The disputes currently raging through literary criticism precisely mirror some of the
central problems facing anyone who would take law seriously; the basis of this parallelism is the
centrality to lav of textual analysis."). But see Kingwell, supra, at 351 (suggesting that at the
same time "law is utterly unlike literature in that the practices governed by its texts have quite
different goals").
22. For example, Kenneth Abraham writes:
The issues that trouble literary theory ... are strikingly similar to those that have
troubled thinking about statutory interpretation. Practitioners of both disciplines have
debated at length about the nature of the texts with which they are concerned, the
relation of the author's intention to the meaning of a text, and the character of the
reader's knowledge of a text's meaning.
Kenneth S. Abraham, Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory: Some Common Concerns of
an Unlikely Pair, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 21, at 116.
23. Robin West has argued that "for many of its most prominent members interest in the
nature of interpretation, and a willingness to borrow from literary studies to further that inquiry,
are defining, not just incidental, features of the law and literature movement." WEST, supra note
9, at 203. This formulation suggests the movement can be humanist or hermeneutic, but not both.
24. Richard Posner and Robin West both include law and narrative "within" law and
literature in their most recent books. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 345-57; WEST, supra note 9,
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scholars, whom I shall call "narrative" law-and-lits, are far less interested
in either literary works or interpretive theory than in attending to the stories
told within law by clients, by lawyers, by judges, and by doctrine itself.
Narrative law-and-lits are interested in those stories not for moral uplift or
interpretive insight but rather for evaluating the stories' persuasive impact.'
their evidentiary value,26 and their epistemological implications.2 7 Again,
there is little connection between the interests of narrative law-and-lits and
those of either humanist or hermeneutic law-and-lits.
B. Divisions Within Each Strand
Within each strand of law and literature, there are deep problems and
divisions. Let us begin with the moral uplift theme of humanist law-and-lit.
First, nothing guarantees that reading literature will actually help attain the
goals of the moral uplift project. Surely many an insensitive brute has read
great books without becoming one whit less insensitive or brutish. And
even if it were true that lawyers could learn something from literature about
human nature, nonrational understanding, and moral judgment, it is not
clear that literature is the only-let alone the best-source of education on
these matters. Why not study psychology, cognitive theory, or ethics?
Moreover, what do these goals have to do specifically with law, anyway?
Surely doctors also need to know every bit as much as lawyers about
at 207-15; see also MINDA, supra note 11, at 153 (including narrative among "the basic forms of
jurisprudence" of the law-and-literature movement).
25. See, e.g., Paul Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, in LAW's STORIES:
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 2, 5 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996)
(" Storytelling in law is narrative within a culture of argument. Virtually everyone in the legal
culture... is explicitly or implicitly making an argument and trying to persuade. Storytelling is,
or is made to function as, argument.") [hereinafter LAW'S STORIES]; Gerald Lpez, Lay
Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. I passim (1984) (describing the role of "stock stories" in both
ordinary and legal persuasion).
26. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REv. 607, 614
(1994) ("Gaylegal narratives have important informational value."); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal
Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1, 7 (1991)
(offering "narratives and poems from the lives of survivors of domestic violence, and a few from
the stories of non-survivors," in order "[t]o illustrate the contrast between women's lives and
legal and cultural stereotypes"); Ruthann Robson, Beginning from (My) Experience: The
Paradoxes of Lesbian/Queer Narrativities, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1387, 1387 (1997) ("[T]he
importance of narrative rests upon the belief that the present legal landscape can be improved if
those of us outside the dominant group make public our experiences.").
27. As Eskridge notes:
[H]uman decisionmaking is weblike, in that one value or line of thinking is connected
to and reinforced by many other values or lines of thought. The connections and
reinforcing features of thought are not systematic, and for that reason they are hard to
conceptualize in the abstract. Concrete narratives of actual interactions and histories
can illustrate these interconnections, however.
Eskridge, supra note 26, at 617 (footnote omitted); see also Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword:
Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073, 2088-94 (1989) (suggesting that the existence of multiple
plausible stories of a single event raises questions about the "objectivist theory of truth").
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human nature, the role of the emotions in human thinking, and moral
decisionmaking. Indeed, a medicine and literature movement has grown up
around just these claims.'
Even assuming both that moral uplift is worthwhile and that literature
can provide it, there is a question about which books, exactly, should be
read. The most salient version of this question concerns the construction of
the "canon." 2 9 The arguments that the traditional canon is limited are (I
hope) too well developed to require recapitulation here.30 Suffice it to say
that the more the canon excludes the voices of outsiders and women, the
less enriching and emancipatory the cross of literature with law is likely to
be.31
Yet there is another problem of selection, even within the existing
canon. Why read one book rather than another? The original humanist law-
and-lits at least could narrow the field somewhat, as they argued that
lawyers should read books that were about law in some sense-containing a
trial scene, portraying "typical traits of a lawyer or judge," delineating the
prosecution and punishment of a crime, or having a plot into which some
point of law entered.32 But with limited exceptions,33 contemporary
humanist law-and-lits do not limit their reading to works touching law.
Beatrix Potter's The Tale of Peter Rabbit,3' James Fenimore Cooper's The
Deerslayer,35 Toni Morrison's Beloved,36 and Charlotte Brontd's Jane
Eyre37 have all been enlisted in aid of the moral uplift project. Indeed, what
28. See, e.g., HOWARD BRODY, STORIES OF SICKNESS (1987); JULIA EPSTEIN, ALTERED
CONDITIONS: DISEASE, MEDICINE, AND STORYTELLING (1995); KATHRYN MONTGOMERY
HUNTER, DOCTORS' STORIES: THE NARRATIVE STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE (1991).
29. On "canonicity" within law and literature generally, see J.M. Balkin & Sanford
Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARv. L. REV. 963, 968-69 (1998).
30. See generally, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can
Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1929 (1991) (discussing outsiders and the
canon); Carolyn Heilbrun & Judith Resnik, Convergences: Law, Literature, and Feminism, 99
YALE L.J. 1913 (1990) (discussing women and the canon); Judith Resnik, Changing the Topic, 8
CARDOzO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 339 (1996) (same).
31. Robin West discusses the effects on law of the limitations of the literary canon:
The literary canon will reflect the moral sensibilities of the same elite whose interests
are reflected and served by law. Those moral sensibilities might, indeed, be in rebellion
against the legal and political order of the day. But they are nevertheless the
sensibilities of elites. The voices, experiences, and perspectives of outsiders will only
rarely infiltrate, and a form of critique that depends upon the canon for its critical
insights will reflect that limitation.
WEST, supra note 9, at 195. For a defense of the traditional canon, see WEISBERG, supra note 7, at
117-23.
32. These were Wigmore's initial subdivisions of legal novels. See Wigmore, supra note 4, at
574. For a slight restatement of these categories, see Richard H. Weisberg, Wigmore's "Legal
Novels" Revisited: New Resources for the Expansive Lawyer, 71 NW. L. REV. 17, 18 (1976).
33. See WEISBERG, supra note 7, at 34 (noting that Wigmore "was right to focus on books
that had law as their central theme").
34. See WARD, supra note 7, at 100.
35. See DIMOCK, supra note 19, at 27-56.
36. See WEST, supra note 9, at 197-98.
37. See Hirshman, supra note 16, at 209-17.
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work of literature could not be? Does not any work of literature-old or
new, mainstream or alternative-have something to teach about human
nature, the role of the emotions and intuition, and moral decisionmaking?
The problem of apparently random selection is aggravated by the
diversity of styles and attitudes with which humanist law-and-lits read.
Perhaps this diversity was inevitable, as legal scholars seem to have turned
to literary studies just when there was the least consensus within the latter
field about how to read.39 Whatever the reason, the result is unquestionable:
One humanist law-and-lit might read in a New Critical style,4" while
another may be concerned with historical context,41 and still another might
be an intentionalist.42
Ironically, for all the apparent diversity, there is a certain sameness to
the structure of humanist law-and-lit writing. Such scholarship often seems
to oscillate between the poles of high generality and exacting specificity,
offering large and abstract claims, and supporting them with closely
detailed readings of selected texts. The typical essay43 begins with an
assertion about the connection between literature and law-a statement,
usually, of what literature can teach lawyers. 44 It then proffers a work of
38. Judge Posner has explicitly repudiated this position, arguing that only literature that has
withstood the test of time and survived in the literary "marketplace" is capable of teaching
valuable lessons. POSNER, supra note 13, at 11-23.
39. Robert Weisberg notes:
[The] turn to literature for renewal is ironic, since ... it is literature itself whose
internal troubles seem to best reflect the various types of alienation, malaise, and
disbelief which are said to distress modem culture. In that regard, it may be more
appropriate to look to literature as a model of postmodernist confusion than as a cure
for it
Robert Weisberg, Reading Poethics, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1103, 1103 (1994) (book review).
40. See, e.g., Jeffrey Malkin, Law on a Darkling Plain, 101 HARV. L. REV. 702, 711 (1988)
(book review) (asserting that James Boyd White's readings reflect a "New Critical" approach,
along with a "modified version of reader response theory").
41. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Don't Know Much About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law and
Literature, 97 YALE L.J. 777, 781-82 (1988) (arguing that Posner "egregiously lacks" a sense of
history); Mark V. Tushnet, Translation as Argument, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 105, 113-18
(1990) (book review) (criticizing White for ignoring history).
42. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. REV.
1351, 1361 (1986) ("I believe it perfectly consistent for someone to be an 'intentionalist' when it
comes to reading statutes and the Constitution and a 'New Critic' when it comes to reading works
of literature .... ). But see WEISBERG, supra note 7, at 197 (asserting that Posner is actually an
intentionalist, not the New Critic he claims to be). For Posner's most recent views, see POSNER,
supra note 13, at 209-54.
43. Almost any of the works previously cited in this Essay could also be cited in this
footnote. For a collection of essays reflecting this typical structure, see LAW AND LITERATURE
PERSPECTIVES (Bruce L. Rockwood ed., 1996).
44. See, e.g., Paul J. Heald, Medea and the Un-Man, in LITERATURE AND LEGAL PROBLEM
SOLVING: LAW AND LITERATURE AS ETHICAL DISCOURSE 55, 57 (Paul J. Heald ed., 1998)
(stating that "[fliction comprises a huge repository of stories about who should live and who
should die, what is good and what is evil, what is heinous and what is merely pathetic," and
therefore judges can look to literature to "give content to the term 'heinous"' for purposes of
determining who should receive the death penalty under Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356
(1988)).
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literature that will demonstrate the connection and teach the lesson4 There
follows a summary of the plot and, where appropriate, the characters.46
Then comes the most difficult step, as the message of the literary work for
law is drawn out.47 Here we find a close examination of a particular passage
or turn of the plot and what that passage or turn "means., 48 From the
particular, we move back to the general, where-to no one's surprise-we
find that the promised connection has been made, the lesson taught.
49
Is it true that "Franz Kafka's fictional works on the nature of law
dramatize a dark underside of [Richard] Posner's argument that the fact of
consent morally legitimates our legal, social, and personal worlds" ?.90 Is it
correct that, in Song of Myself, Walt Whitman "claims that the light of the
poetic imagination is a crucial agent of democratic equality for.., excluded
people, since only that imagination will get the facts of their lives fight" ?"
Is "the lesson of The Scarlet Letter" that "once the seriousness of the
decision to bear or beget a child is recognized, excluding women from
citizenship by denying them this freedom is wrong" ?52 Is Aeschylus'
Oresteia trilogy "fundamentally a story about the emergence of law" ?
45. See, e.g., Judy M. Comett, The Treachery of Perception: Evidence and Experience in
Clarissa, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 165, 168-69 (1994) (offering Samuel Richardson's Clarissa to
expose "the fundamental assumptions underlying the Lockean framework of eighteenth-century
evidence law"); Heald, supra note 44, at 58-60 (offering Dante's Inferno, C.S. Lewis's
Perelandra, and Euripides' Medea on the issue of "heinousness"); see also Margaret J. Fried &
Lawrence A. Frolik, The Limits of Law: Litigation, Lawyers and the Search for Justice in Russell
Banky' The Sweet Hereafter, 7 CARDOzo STUD. L. & LITERATuRE 1 (1995) ("[The Sweet
Hereafter] presents a rather pessimistic account of our system of law, in particular the tort law
system, and questions the law's ability to determine the truth and render justice.").
46. See, e.g., Comett, supra note 45, at 177-90 (summarizing plot developments in Clarissa);
Fried & Frolik, supra note 45, at 3-17 (summarizing the narratives of the individual characters in
The Sweet Hereafter); Heald, supra note 44, at 58-63 (summarizing stories of murder told in
various literary works).
47. See, e.g., Heald, supra note 44, at 63 ("Dante and Lewis are clearly attempting to
describe a different type of murderer than is Euripides."). But see id. at 63-65 (recognizing
"potential difficulties with using literature to answer the question" of what kind of murderer
should receive the death penalty).
48. See, e.g., Fried & Frolik, supra note 45, at 17-18 (examining the demolition derby scene
at the conclusion of The Sweet Hereafter); Heald, supra note 44, at 61 (examining a speech by
Jason in Medea).
49. See, e.g., Comett, supra note 45, at 191-92 ("The eighteenth-century law of evidence
presupposed human depravity .... Clarissa's story exposes ... the inadequacy of the Lockean
model of cognitive self-sufficiency for knowers who am innocent and powerless."); Fried &
Frolik, supra note 45, at 18 ("Through the microcosm of [the fictional town of] Sam Dent, Banks
reveals the fundamental belief that justice means the punishment of the guilty."); Heald, supra
note 44, at 72 (arguing that "a reading of Euripides, Dante, and Lewis" supports the "specific"
thesis that "Medea's crimes are not heinous for the purposes of Maynard, but that the Un-man's
are" and that "[a] yet broader suggestion might be made that Euripides, Dante, and Lewis
improve the quality of the heinousness debate, raising the ethical level of the discussion
irrespective of what standard the state eventually decides to implement").
50. WEST, supra note 7, at 29.
51. NUSSBAUM, supra note 14, at 119.
52. Hirshman, supra note 16, at 223.
53. Gewirtz, supra note 19, at 1044.
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These assertions may or may not be true. Certainly they are not self-
evidently true. The problem is not that lawyers and legal scholars are
incapable of informed, sensitive readings of important literary works;
interpretation of literary works need not be the exclusive province of
literary scholars. But literary scholars rarely agree among themselves on
anything like a single correct interpretation of an important creative work.54
I have presented the conclusory interpretations above in a rather harsh,
decontextualized light, but a disconcerting aspect of the moral uplift project
is that it almost demands that works of literature be read, like fables, for
their "message." The certainty with which legal scholars assert what are
actually quite contestable readings is, thus, understandable, but still
incongruous. Not only do the conclusions impart an air of closure that
seems inappropriate to the complexity of the works at issue, but the
certainty with which they are proposed seems at odds with the inquiring
spirit alleged to animate the turn to literature in the first place.
And just to ice the cake, humanist law-and-lits cannot agree over the
substance of these readings. While humanist law-and-lits agree that it is
important to look at law through the lens of literature, this turns out to be a
very superficial commonality, for what they see through the lens is almost
unrecognizably different. The individual theorists often disagree-and
vehemently-over what to make of what they have read. For example,
Robin West and Richard Posner diverge dramatically over the implications
of the works of Franz Kafka on the core tenets of law and economics."
Posner also strongly disagrees with Richard Weisberg's readings of
Melville's Billy Budd and Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov.56
Weisberg in turn challenges Posner's readings of these works, as well as
Posner's interpretation of The Merchant of Venice." Weisberg also
extensively critiques James Boyd White's readings of various literary
works.5" And Robin West has criticized the projects of both White and
Weisberg.59
I have dwelt at length on the internal divisions among humanist law-
and-lits, but only because their difficulties are illustrative of the deeper
problem of holding each strand in this movement together. Among
hermeneutic law-and-lits, there are also deep rifts. Debate over interpretive
54. Indeed, it has been argued that the goal of literary as opposed to legal scholarship is to
"open up" texts rather than to discover a single meaning. See Gerald Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its
Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 1545, 1573 (1990) ("While scholars in law and
literature share an interest in the interpretation of texts, they are likely to have quite different ideas
about what that might entail. Literary scholarship is a realm in which the illumination of a text
does not involve the identification of its one true meaning.").
55. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 182-205 (summarizing the debate).
56. See id. at 165-79.
57. See WEISBERG, supra note 7, at 196-210.
58. See id. at 224-50.
59. See WEST, supra note 9, at 180-88 (criticizing White), 190-200 (criticizing Weisberg).
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methodologies has mushroomed within English and comparative literature
departments over the past ten to twenty years, so it is not surprising that
hermeneutic law-and-lits are easily as divided among themselves as
humanist law-and-lits. The preeminent issue for hermeneutic law-and-lits
has been power: Who or what "controls" the meaning of a text-the
author, the reader, the words of the text, conventions of reading? Beyond a
tendency to approach this issue by focusing on a single legal text, the U.S.
Constitution, the hermeneutic law-and-lits have found little on which to
agree. Intentionalists clash with deconstructionists on one side and
textualists on the other.' Meanwhile, other scholars enter the argument
only to assert that nothing at all turns on the outcome,61 while still others
have made the opposite point: that too much turns on the outcome of real
legal cases to make the analogy to literary interpretation apt.6"
Finally, law-and-narrative scholarship itself has three strands, one
focusing on the strategic use of storytelling as a persuasive technique, the
second focusing on the evidentiary use bf storytelling to supply information
about how the law actually functions in real-world settings, and the third
focusing on how multiple inconsistent stories might accurately be told of
the same event and raising questions about the sustainability of the legal
vision of truth as univocal.63 As is true within both humanist and
hermeneutic law-and-lit, the three strands of law and narrative scholarship
often conflict with one another. Evidentiary storytelling, for example, is
meant to show something true, but previously unnoticed, about the world,
whereas the telling of multiple stories is meant to challenge the idea of
objective truth.6'
C. Is There a "Movement" Here?
Much of the writing about law and literature has more or less taken for
granted that there is a law-and-literature movement and progressed quickly
into discussions of its basic divisions into "law in literature" and "law as
60. A sampling of the various approaches can be found in INTERPRETING LAW AND
LITERATURE, supra note 21.
61. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773
(1987).
62. This observation was first made by Robert Cover in Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J.
1601 (1986), and was then reiterated by Robin West. See WEST, supra note 7, at 89-176. In more
recent work, West has admitted that these dissents "did not ring loudly." WEST, supra note 9, at
203.
63. These strands are described at somewhat greater length in Baron & Epstein, supra note
17, at 668-70.
64. For further development of this point, see Jane B. Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law
Narrative?, 45 BuFF. L. REV. 141 (1997).
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literature." 65 To be sure, "law and literature" classes are being taught at a
not insignificant number of American law schools,66 and a reasonably high
number of scholarly works have focused on various aspects of law and
literature.67 But mere interest in law and literature does not a movement
make.
Does it matter that the strands of the law-and-literature movement are
all to some extent internally divided and that the three strands connect to
each other so loosely? Certainly it has been argued that the
"interdisciplinary eclecticism" 68 of law-and-humanities scholarship is itself
a good, fostering creativity and experimentation. Yet the less attractive
possibility is that what some see as creative diversity others will see as
methodological confusion. In the world of law and literature, as we have
seen, it is not uncommon for different scholars to find very different
messages in the works they read. Again, perhaps it is good that there is such
sharp divergence among scholars, for it suggests that literature is a rich and
complex source, capable of multiple interpretations and thereby provocative
of dialogue. But, to put things in the worst possible light, perhaps the
divergence reveals that legal scholars can find just about anything in
literature-hope, despair, community, alienation-and that what they do
find is more or less a function of what they were looking for initially.
Some will argue that, to this point, I have been highly unfair to the law-
and-literature movement, emphasizing its worst problems and using as
examples its most exaggerated claims. I have, indeed, given scant attention
to works that, without making particularly grand assertions about the power
of literature to transform law, nonetheless use literary techniques to
analyze, for example, the generally unacknowledged rhetorical structure of
judicial opinions. 69 Nor have I described articles that employ fictional
works (or characters from those works) as heuristic types that provide rich,
nuanced, and yet shorthand descriptions of professional identities and
65. The former is generally the focus of what I have called the humanist law-and-lits, while
the latter is generally the focus of the hermeneutic law-and-lits. The distinction, however, has
been widely criticized. See, e.g., Ayer, supra note 11, at 1585 (noting four "disparate topics" that
pass for "law and literature"); Morawetz, supra note 11, at 497-99 (discussing four strands of lav
and literature); see also supra note 13 (arguing that any description of the divisions within law
and literature will be to a certain extent arbitrary).
66. See Elizabeth Villiers Gemmette, Law and Literature: An Unnecessarily Suspect Class in
the Liberal Arts Component of the Law School Curriculum, 23 VALPARAISO U. L. REv. 267
(1989) (analyzing the place of law and literature within the law school curriculum); Elizabeth
Villiers Gemmette, Law and Literature: Joining the Class Action, 29 VALPARAISO U. L. REV.
665 (1995) (surveying law-and-literature courses in United States law schools).
67. See, e.g., INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 21; POSNER, supra note 13;
WARD, supra note 7; WEISBERG, supra note 7; WEST, supra note 7.
68. Austin Sarat, Traditions and Trajectories in Law and Humanities Scholarship, 10 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 101, 103 (1998).
69. See, e.g., Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as a Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 201 (1990); Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion, in LAw'S STORIES,
supra note 25, at 187.
1072 [Vol. 108: 1059
The Problems of Interdisciplinarity
dilemmas.7" I have said little about creative and enlightening juxtapositions
of literary and legal treatment of concepts such as a "person" 71 or
"property." 72 Nor have I touched on the connections between law and
literature and other movements such as lav and feminism.73
I have not, in short, covered every aspect of work in law and literature,
nor have I presented the movement in its best possible light.74 These
choices have been deliberate. My project here is not to praise law and
literature, but to try to explain why efforts to use literature in legal
contexts-many of which are praiseworthy indeed-have had, relatively
speaking, so little impact. For this project, it is important to look at law-
and-literature scholarship with a cynic's eye. Taking a cynical view of the
divergent readings that seem possible-all held seriously and confidently,
all tending in different directions-it is not surprising that many remain
skeptical about literature's potential as a source of enlightenment for law.
II. LAW, LrERATURE, AND INTERDISCiPLiNARITY
A. The Legal Academy, Interdisciplinarity, and Law and Literature
At this point it is probably worth reflecting for a moment about style
and tone. Having argued that there may not actually be a law-and-literature
movement, it seems odd to make claims about what "law and literature" or
"law-and-literature scholarship" has or has not done. The obvious
alternative is to speak very particularly of individual authors, focusing on
the nuances of each's work. The risk here, of course, is descent into the ad
hominem-a risk that, alas, has all too often been realized!5 Since I do not
wish to write in these terms, I will assume that, notwithstanding
70. See, e.g., William Simon, Ethics, Professionalism, and Meaningful Work, 26 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 445 (1997) (using portrayals of lawyers in works by, inter alia, Dickens, Dostoevsky, and
Kafka to illustrate dilemmas of professional alienation); see also Rob Atkinson, How the Butler
Was Made To Do It: The Perverted Professionalism of The Remains of the Day, 105 YALE L.J.
177 (1995) (using Ishiguro's novel as a "text" on professionalism).
71. See, e.g., Barbara Johnson, Anthropomorphism in Lyric and Law, 10 YALE J.L. &
HUiAN. 549, 550 (1998) (dealing with the concept of a "person").
72. See, e.g., Roberta Kevelson, Property as Rhetoric in Law, 4 CARDOZO STUD. L. &
LrrERATURE 189 (1992) (dealing with the concept of "property").
73. For an overview, see the essays collected in BEYOND PORTIA: WOMEN, LAW, AND
LrrERAT.RE iN THE UNrrED STATES (Jacqueline St. Joan & Annette Bennington McElhiney eds.,
1997). See also Judith Resnik, Singular and Aggregate Voices: Audience and Authority in Law &
Literature and in Law & Feminism, in LAW AND LrrERATURE, supra note 8 (manuscript at 7-30)
(assessing the implications for the law-and-literature movement of the narrative techniques
employed by gender task forces).
74. While I am confessing, I suppose I should note that I myself have used personal narrative
in some of my own scholarly work and so may be counted a part of the very movement I here
critique. See Jane B. Baron, Intention, Interpretation, and Stories, 42 DUKE L.J. 630, 661-64
(1992) (telling the story of my father's will).
75. To provide examples here would simply reenact the wrong of such attacks.
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divergences among the humanist, hermeneutic, and narrative strands of law
and literature, it nonetheless makes sense to think about something that
might be called the "enterprise" of law and literature. This enterprise, most
broadly conceived, is about assessing the connections between two fields
often thought to be different.
There is a kind of standard story about this enterprise. 6 Until the Civil
War, this story goes, the man of law in the United States (there were, of
course, no women lawyers) was also a man of letters. But by about 1870,
when Christopher Columbus Langdell became dean of Harvard Law
School, law began to be conceptualized as a science rather than an art, a
specialized professional discipline characterized by its own logic,
methodology, and subject matter. Once law became an independent field,
literature was no longer a part of legal education, nor was it a part of
lawyers' everyday competence. Putting this point in a slightly different
way, there was no "and" to law in its Langdellian form; law was
autonomous. Indeed, this lack of an "and" was what made law law.
77
This vision of law as autonomous has been resisted almost from the
start. Early in the twentieth century, legal "realists" began to question
whether legal principles alone could dictate or explain outcomes, while
legal "progressives" argued that law was not an autonomous system of
norms, but rather "an instrument for the conscious pursuit of social
welfare," requiring lawyers to understand not just legal but also social facts
and to act as social engineers. 78 Despite this resistance, however, the notion
of law as an independent, self-sustaining field remained powerful.
Oddly, one marker of this power is the development of various "law
ands" that offer other areas of knowledge and alternative methodologies to
76. This story relies heavily on two highly influential books: ROBERT F. FERGUSON, LAW
AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1984); and ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s (1983).
I am not a historian, and therefore I cannot directly attest to the accuracy of this story, but I
believe it to be true. However this may be, there is no doubting the story's power in structuring
accounts of the place of law and literature in the intellectual and social history of the legal
profession. See, e.g., Hirshman, supra note 16, at 197-98 (situating the "resurgence of the
profession's interest in literary, imaginative representation" in the context of the historical
developments described by Ferguson and Stevens); Brook Thomas, Reflections on the Law and
Literature Revival, 17 CRITICAL INQUIRY 510, 513-14 (1991) (explaining that the law-and-
literature movement "attempts to reconnect disciplines that have a history of connections");
WEST, supra note 9, at 182-83 (describing some parts of the contemporary law-and-literature
movement as attempts to "resurrect for the modem sensibility" a 19th-century ideal of what it
means to be a good lawyer).
77. For more on Langdell and the vision of law as autonomous, see NV. Burlette Carter,
Reconstructing Langdell, 32 GA. L. REV. 1, 4-11 (1997); Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy,
45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (1983) [hereinafter Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy]; Thomas C. Grey,
Modem American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493, 495-96 (1996) (book review) [hereinafter
Grey, Modem American Legal Thought].
78. Grey, Modem American Legal Thought, supra note 77, at 498-99. On legal realism, see
NEIL DuXBURY, PATTERNs OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 65-159 (1995); LAURA KAL-MAN,
LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927-1960 (1986).
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supplement, enrich, or correct law. In this conceptual scheme, literature is
one of many rich sources that provide information about and perspective on
law, and law and literature is the interdisciplinary endeavor by which these
two particular fields are used to enhance each other. That is, law and
literature is but one of several "interdisciplines" involving law. And so it
would seem that the law-and-literature enterprise offers the opportunity to
explore questions about the definition of disciplinary boundaries and,
indeed, about the notion of interdisciplinarity generally.
To examine law and literature as an instance of interdisciplinarity, it is
helpful to focus less on particular substantive claims about the ways in
which law is the same as or different from literature, and more on the way
in which claims about law and literature are structured. Law-and-literature
scholars repeatedly ask questions in something like the following form:
"How is law like (or unlike) literature?" or "What is it that literature has to
say to law?" 79 The answers, predictably, tend to follow the form of the
questions, asserting that "literature is (not) like law in these (enumerated)
ways"; or that "literature is (not) useful to law in these (enumerated)
senses"; or that "(un)like law, literature... .,, " Both the questions and the
answers seem to posit that law and literature are separate disciplinary
domains that either do or do not meaningfully connect to one another. That
is, there is "literature" and there is "law," and they are, apparently,
separate realms that can be like or unlike, useful or not useful to one
another.
At the same time, however, an important component of law-and-
literature scholarship is devoted to establishing whether law and literature
are in fact appropriately considered two enterprises (the view, for example,
of Richard Posner"1) or one (the view, most notably, of James Boyd
79. See, e.g., Kingwell, supra note 21 (asking in its title what literature contributes to law);
James Boyd White, What Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 2014 (1989)
(book review) (asking the latter question); see also Abraham, supra note 22, at 125 (comparing
literary and statutory interpretation); Gewirtz, supra note 19, at 1043 ("I am ... interested ... in
efforts to augment the 'law and literature' movement with work that explores the relevance to law
of literature itself ...."); Paul J. Heald, Law and Literature as Ethical Discourse, in LITERATURE
AND LEGAL PROBLEM SOLVING, supra note 44, at 4 ("The essential connection of law to the
questioni of how we should live... makes the study of literature relevant to law.").
80. See, e.g., Michael J. Kaufman, The Value of Friendship in Law and Literature, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. 645, 704 (1992) (" [L]aw, like literature, is only the play of differences ....");
Weisberg, supra note 39, at 1106 ("Law seeks to close texts ... while literary scholarship sets
out.., to open them up."); Gretchen A. Craft, Note, The Persistence of Dread in Law and
Literature, 102 YALE L.J. 521, 522 (1992) ("Literature captures and suspends fear, allowing
readers to contemplate perils of an arbitrary fate. Law, on the other hand, is an antidote to fate.");
John Fischer, Note, Reading Literature/Reading Law: Is There a Literary Jurisprudence?, 72
TEX. L. REV. 135, 159 (1993) ("Unlike literature... the law inevitably speaks in the language of
power and coercion .....
81. As Posnernotes:
Law and literature have significant commonalities and intersections, but the differences
are as important. Law is a system of social control as well as a body of texts, and its
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White 2). This debate thus calls into question what much ordinary law-and-
literature scholarship assumes. One would think, then, that as a whole the
law-and-literature enterprise would be very thoughtful about the
delineation-or dare I say, the construction-of disciplinary boundaries.
Ongoing debates arising in other "law ands" in the United States would
make such thoughtfulness very timely. These debates tend to be structured
by the same compare-and-contrast strategy used to assess law's
(un)likeness to literature. The nature and aims of "law" are juxtaposed
against those of, say, philosophy or history83 to ascertain whether the
methods of the latter can be used in the service of law' So, for example, it
has been asserted that historians "favor context, change, and explanation,"
while authors of lawyers' legal history "value text, continuity, and
prescription." 85 Similarly, it has been argued that, within philosophy,
"authority" is "earned" by having "garner[ed] support through centuries
of reasoned debate and intellectual assessment," while legal authority is
"institutional," resting on "the mere fact that a case has been decided one
way rather than another, or that a judge has made a particular
pronouncement."8 6 The comparisons depict each of the contrasted
disciplines as separate, having its own "internal" conventions and
operation is illuminated by the social sciences and judged by ethical criteria. Literature
is an art, and the best methods for interpreting and evaluating it are aesthetic.
See POSNER, supra note 13, at 7; see also Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Relationship
Reargued, 72 VA. L. REV. 1351, 1392 (1986) ("I myself do not think law is a humanity. It is a
technique of government.").
82. See WHITE, HERACLES' Bow, supra note 4, at xi (" [Flor me the activity of law is at heart
a literary one...."); JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL
AND LEGAL CRITICISM 91 (1990) ("The law is ... at its heart an interpretive and compositional-
and in this sense a radically literary-activity.") [hereinafter WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION].
Similarly, White has noted:
The heart of literary discourse is self-consciousness of the language itself: of its social
and cultural implications, of its over-commitment and dead spots.... [L]iterary texts
are characteristically marked by a tension between languages (such as that between the
concrete and the abstract); the effect is to qualify each language while using it. The
art-it is the art of "integration"-lies in writing two ways at once. In this respect law
is naturally literary, for the legal case as we normally think of it can be neither an
exercise in abstract analysis nor the presentation of mere particulars, but requires the
interaction of both modes of discourse; similarly, it requires attention to the case not
from one point of view or another-the plaintiff s or the defendant's-but from both at
once.
WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION, supra, at 40.
83. See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 10 (history); Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on
the Turn to History in Legal Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 87 (1997) (history); Brian Leiter,
Intellectual Voyeurism in Legal Scholarship, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 79 (1992) (philosophy);
Nussbaum, supra note 10 (philosophy); see also Annelise Riles, Representing In-Between: Law,
Anthropology, and the Rhetoric of Interdisciplinarity, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 597 (anthropology);
Mike Townsend, Implications of Foundational Crises in Mathematics: A Case Study in
Interdisciplinary Legal Research, 71 WASH. L. REV. 51 (1996) (mathematics).
84. See, e.g., Nussbaum, supra note 10, at 1630-41 (describing how philosophy can be useful
in legal education).
85. LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 180 (1996).
86. Collier, supra note 10, at 220.
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objectives, but almost no one is terribly clear about how these boundaries
are drawn. Indeed, the less attention given the boundaries, the better;
acknowledging that sometimes lawyers are sensitive to context (even in
their use of history) or that some legal authority is respected precisely
because its reasoning has stood up over time would undermine substantially
the rhetorical force of the comparisons.
Whatever the reason, most assessments of "ands" other than literature
assume that disciplines have boundaries and are highly critical of how the
boundaries are treated. The debates, most noisily typified by controversy
over the use of history by those advocating civic republican interpretations
of constitutional theory,88 have been characterized by charges that legal
scholars "misuse" or "abuse" other disciplines, 9 that their analyses lack
"rigor" or are "sub-standard," 9 and that they use non-law theories as
"decoration" to lend spurious authority to ideas that should stand, or fall,
on their own.9 1 These charges have led in turn to suggestions that
interdisciplinarity in law is always merely apparent,92 that, conversely, the
very idea of a disciplinary perspective or concept has become
unintelligible, 93 and that attempts at interdisciplinarity only create new,
unrecognized disciplines.94
Echoes of these controversies may occasionally and faintly be heard in
writing about law and literature. Here and there one comes across the
injunction not to read literature for political or ethical purposes, but rather
87. Those who have explicitly considered what exactly divides legal scholarship from other
disciplines have argued that the determining factor is the overwhelming prescriptive nature of
legal scholarship. See Edward L. Rubin, Law And and the Methodology of Law, 1997 WIS. L.
REV. 521, 542 ("The defining feature of standard legal scholarship is its prescriptive voice; ... it
is this feature that distinguishes it from other academic fields."); see also Wetlaufer, supra note
54, at 1566, 1572 ("One could fairly say that the primary purpose of conventional legal
scholarship is to generate usable solutions to problems that existwithin the legal arena"; lawyers
will therefore be reluctant to consult disciplines that do not "offer the kinds of determinate,
exclusive answer that the business of 'deciding' requires").
88. For a summary of the critiques of republican historiography, see Nomi Maya Stolzenberg,
A Book of Laughter and Forgetting: Kalman's "Strange Career" and the Marketing of Civic
Republicanism, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1025, 1027-39 (1998) (book review).
89. Sometimes a title says it all. See, e.g., Collier, supra note 10 (The Use and Abuse of
Humanistic Theory in Law...); Nussbaum, supra note 10 (The Use and Abuse of Philosophy in
Legal Education).
90. See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 10, at 551-55; Leiter, supra note 83, at 80.
91. Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: The Case of History-in-Law, 71 CH.-
KENT L. REV. 909, 914 (1996); see, e.g., Charles W. Collier, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship
in Search of a Paradigm, 42 DUKE LJ 840, 852 (1993).
92. See Tushnet, supra note 91, at 934-35 ("Law-office history is a legal practice, not a
historical one. The criteria for evaluating it, for determining what is a successful performance,
must be drawn from legal practice rather than from historical practice. I believe the same
conclusion can be drawn about interdisciplinary legal scholarship generally." (emphasis added)).
93. See G. Edward White, Reflections on the "Republican Revival": Interdisciplinary
Scholarship in the LegalAcademy, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 28-29 (1994).
94. See STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND IT'S A GOOD
THING, Too 237 (1994).
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"for itself"9 or by reference to "aesthetic" criteria.96 On the whole,
however, discussions of the relation of law to literature seem remarkably
disconnected from the larger debate about interdisciplinarity in law.
This disconnection is somewhat ironic because the law-and-literature
endeavor is typical of other "law ands" in its remarkable lack of self-
consciousness about the use of the term "law," especially as that term is
contrasted to the equally un-self-consciously employed term "literature"
("history," "philosophy," etc.). One example of this phenomenon is the
argument, made as part of the moral uplift project of humanist law-and-lit,
that literature is a source of values otherwise missing from the law.97 This
argument rests on a vision of law as inherently empty or ignorant of moral
values-values that must be supplied from "outside" of law. This vision is
sustained by the initial story of law's development, in which law
distinguished itself as a profession by excluding literary and philosophical
concerns; once law was conceptualized as analytical, scientific and
practical, the literary and philosophical concerns that were once part of law
could only reappear if they were yanked back "in." 9 This same vision of
law-as-barren-science recurs in frequent contrasts between dry, technical,
95. C.R.B. Dunlop, Literature Studies in Law Schools, 3 CARDozo STUD. L. & LrrERATURE
63, 93-95 (1991).
96. POSNER, supra note 13, at 306, 329; see also Miller, supra note 11, at 261 (questioning
whether James Boyd White's use of fields of law and literature is "undisciplined").
97. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20; see also Heald, supra note 44, at 3-4 ("Legal
language often obscures the value-laden nature of legal choices. In fact, law talk is seldom
concerned with overfly separating good from bad." But "fiction is an undeniably rich collection
of studies in the appropriateness of human action." Thus, literature "may be a unique repository
for information capable of enriching legal decision making."); Hirshman, supra note 16, at 179
(" Since... judging involves and will continue to involve judgements based on moral principles,
how can society generally, and educators in particular, produce judges of the appropriate moral
character and habits of mind to formulate such principles? The answer, I suggest, is implicit in the
return of law to the humanities after its long and uneasy sojourn in the realm of science ..." ).
98. See William H. Page, The Place of Law and Literature, 39 VAND. L. REV. 391, 415
(1986) (book review) ("The modem field of law and literature is, paradoxically, a product of the
breakdown of the configuration of law and literature. When law and literature were considered
coordinate disciplines, united by their consonance with universal principles ... by definition there
was no need for an interdisciplinary field of study."). I by no means wish to suggest that the story
of law's development as a separate, nonliterary discipline is false. See supra note 76. Nor do I
mean to suggest that there is, somewhere, an account of the development of law in the United
States that is not a story. See Baron & Epstein, supra note 64, at 171-73 (describing the position
that all arguments and accounts proceed from some nonneutral framework and, in this sense, are
all "stories"). In employing the professionalization story described in the text, law-and-lits
justifiably relied on the best available historical accounts of the rise of law as a profession-
accounts that have not, to my knowledge, been seriously challenged.
On the other hand, there is no denying the professionalization story's utility in demonstrating
the need for an "and" to supplement law. Moreover, law-and-lits have tended to present and
utilize the professionalization story in a rather fiat and simplified way that emphasizes what was
lost when law separated from the humanities in the 19th century. The more unliterary,
unphilosophical, and technical the law is understood to be, the more sense it makes to reach out
toward the moderating and enriching resources of non-law disciplines such as literature.
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rule-governed law and nuanced, emotional, complex literature.99 Such
contrasts rely on---even as they entrench-a fairly conventional vision of
law as a domain empty of anything other than rules, inhabited solely by
unimaginative rule technicians."'
These characterizations have, of course, been questioned. It has been
noted, for example, that there are plenty of emotions, values, and general
human messiness already within the law, as any sensitive reading of the
facts of cases proves. 1' Robert Weisberg has made this point eloquently:
It is obviously desirable that law should be informed by the voice
of the concrete, the particular, the empathetic, the passionate. But to
make this point about legal discourse hardly should require
recurrence to the great works of the Humanities.... Lawyers or
law students are or should be perfectly aware even from
conventional case analysis that human pain underlies doctrinal
abstraction, that the general rules of common law doctrine live in
tension with and are often undone by the particular stories of
parties to the case.0 2
Critiques like Weisberg's suggest that the contrasts between law and
literature are complex, but they do not suggest that there are no meaningful
contrasts. More importantly, they do not articulate explicitly-beyond
assertions that law can be moral, sensitive to values, and so forth-what
understanding of law should be used in drawing the contrasts.
Things are not much better on the hermeneutic or narrative side. The
suggestions that law is like literature in being textual, or that law is
inherently narrative in structure or content, seemed to auger a
reconsideration of the divisions between the disciplines. The promised
reconsideration, however, has often been rather thin. On the hermeneutic
side, the law-and-literature categories reasserted themselves most visibly in
99. See, e.g., Elliott M. Abramson, Law, Humanities and the Hinterlands, 30 J. LEGAL EDUc.
27, 29 (1979) (stating that" [pirofessional training narrows by omitting," but "the humanities can
broaden and free"); Dunlop, supra note 95, at 64 ("Fiction gives legal scholars the opportunity to
get beyond the technical and circumscribed study of legal rules ....").
100. On the construction of law as a place filled almost entirely by rules, see Baron, supra
note 10 (manuscript at 3-4). As I explain below, the boundaries of this domain are in no sense
natural or "real," and, indeed, they may be constructed by the very contrasts that are offered for
purposes of challenging them. See infra text accompanying note 116.
101. See, e.g., Robert Weisberg, Proclaiming Trials as Narratives: Premises and Pretenses,
in LAW'S STORIES, supra note 25, at 61, 70-71 ("To say that we need to read works of
imaginative literature to see [that human pain underlies doctrinal abstraction] is odd.... [Niormal
human minds and sensibilities should realize the point even by reading the bare facts of the
case....").
102. Robert Weisberg, The Law-Literature Enterprise, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 17-18
(1988). Moreover, as noted earlier, many have questioned whether literature is truly a reliable
moral corrective, assuming one is needed. See, e.g., Morawetz, supra note 11, at 518 ("Those who
create literature, no more and no less than those who write legal texts as judges or legislators, have
conflicting ethical insights and occasionally none at all.").
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debates over whether law's textuality is different from literature's,
especially insofar as-as many have argued-interpretations of legal texts
invoke coercive state power, while interpretations of literary texts do not 3
On the narrative side, claims that law is itself a narrative coexist with
claims that law is not narrative enough; that stories, which employ the
particular, the emotional, the human, are needed to counteract the
abstraction and pseudo-objectivity of law." 4 The latter claims reinscribe a
divide between storytelling and legal analysis, with the former correcting
and, in the eyes of some, challenging the latter.0 5
The specifics of these claims, like the claims of humanist law-and-lit,
have been disputed. Some have argued that interpretation outside legal
settings also involves the imposition of significant coercive power and so is
similar to interpretation in law,116 while others, continuing to insist that
legal interpretation is coercive in a way that literary interpretation is not,
have downplayed the importance of that distinction. 7 Critics of narrative
law and literature have questioned "the premise that narrative concreteness
by itself is some sort of guarantee of intellectual integrity or moral
virtue," 03 and also whether, even if it is, particularity alone is capable of
transforming law.09 Again, these critiques suggest that contrasts between
the textuality or narrativity of law and literature should not be drawn
simplistically, but they do not suggest that there are no useful contrasts.
And again, they largely leave unexamined how "law" should be defined in
drawing those contrasts.
The less anyone discusses what "law" is for purposes of comparing
law to literature, the easier it is to think of law in fairly stereotypical terms
drawn from the standard story about law's development as an independent,
nonhumanistic discipline. As depicted by the stereotype, law is
instrumental, analytic, rational, nonemotional, technical, mechanical, and-
103. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 13, at 236 ("A poet tries to create a work of art, a thing of
beauty and pleasure.... A legislature is trying to give commands .... "); Cover, supra note 62, at
1601 (" [Ljegal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death."); see also supra note 62
and accompanying text (describing the different stakes involved in literary and legal
interpretation).
104. For a summary of these themes of the legal storytelling movement, see Jane B. Baron,
Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255, 267-69 (1994); and Jane B. Baron, The Many
Promises of Storytelling in Law, 23 RuTGERS L.J. 79, 86-92 (1991) (book review).
105. [S]tories disrupt... rationalizing, generalizing modes of analysis with a reminder
of human beings and their feelings, quirky developments, and textured vitality.... I
suggest.., that the revival of stories in law is welcome, not as a replacement of legal
doctrine, economic analysis, or philosophic theory but as a healthy disruption and
challenge to them.
Martha Minow, Stories in Law, in LAw's STORIES, supra note 25, at 24, 36:
106. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1626-27 (1991).
107. See, e.g., WEST, supra note 9, at 203.
108. Weisberg, supra note 39, at 1107-08.
109. See Baron & Epstein, supra note 64, at 181-83.
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above all-doctrinal. It is a technological science or craft, a science perhaps
not as completely autonomous as Langdell suggested at the end of the
nineteenth century, but relatively autonomous nonetheless. 1
This depiction of law as autonomous paradoxically reappears even in
approaches that, instead of contrasting law to literature, treat law as a form
of literature. This is most famously the approach of James Boyd White,
who has argued that "the life of the law is ... a life of art, the art of making
meaning in language with others." ' The "central concern" of this life,
White argues, is "the kind of relations that we establish with our inherited
culture and with each other when we speak its language."' 12 Poetry,
philosophy, and law are but specific instances of the general "cultural and
ethical activity of making meaning in relation to others." 113
This view of law as literary1 in character simply renders law
autonomous in a different way. Law does not require supplementation by
anything "outside" of itself, because-given the level of abstraction at
which the process of doing law is described-nearly everything that could
be outside is actually already "inside" law. Law, though broadened,
remains a self-enclosed discipline. Indeed, the broader and more
"integrated" '" law is, the less problematic its self-enclosure comes to
seem.
The tendency in these analyses to treat law as autonomous makes it
difficult to assess the possibilities for connecting law with other disciplines.
Assessing connections requires understanding what lies on either side of the
"and" bridge, but this is precisely the terrain that is not being carefully
mapped. We cannot determine the significance of literature for law if we
uncritically define literature as simply everything law is not,"6 and the same
is true if-as seems to be the case-the law-and-literature enterprise
110. On Langdell's vision of law's autonomy, see sources cited supra note 77. If law-and-lits
truly believed law to be inherently dehumanized or morally dessicated, there would be no point in
calling for the enriching supplementation of literature. Logically, then, the law-and-lits would
seem to be arguing not that law is necessarily autonomous, only that it has (for contingent
historical reasons) become an entity of which Langdell would very much approve. On the other
hand, the "law" to which "literature" is contrasted is never the more humanized, moral,
emotionally sensitive institution it is apparently capable of becoming. For comparative and
rhetorical purposes, "law" becomes mere rules. As I suggest below, the more law is described in
doctrinalist terms, the harder it may be to (re)envision or (re)create it as anything else. See infra
text accompanying note 121.
111. WHITE, HERACLES' BOW, supra note 4, at xii.
112. WHIT, WORDS, supra note 4, at 273.
113. Id. at275.
114. See id. at 283.
115. White emphasizes the importance of" the integration of parts of our culture, and parts of
ourselves, into new wholes." WHMrR, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION, supra note 82, at 21.
116. See J.M. Balldn, The Domestication of Law and Literature, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
787, 799 (1989) (book review) (critiquing Posner's analysis of law and literature on precisely this
ground).
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continues to describe law as either everything literature is not or everything
literature already is.
I do not mean to call here for a new or different set of boundaries; quite
the contrary. Fruitful exploration of interdisciplinarity in law and literature
does not require the delineation of the "true" and "real" boundaries
between law and literature. It cannot, for precisely the reason that "law"
and "literature" are not natural categories describing disciplines that are
just there, preexisting and predefined. Our understanding of the categories
may be as much a product of our attempts to compare and contrast them as
of any quality that they have apart from the context of those contrasts. And
the interesting question is not whether any particular definition of the
categories is true, but what it might tell us about our aspirations for law and
for the place of law in our culture.
It is in this light that the curious reaffirmance of law's autonomy seems
most significant. Locating emotion and empathy outside law and inside
literature, as so much humanist law and literature has done, suggests an
unacknowledged investment in exactly that vision of cold, mechanical,
dehumanized law that literature is supposed to combat. Similarly, locating
interpretive power inside law and outside literature, as so much
hermeneutic law and literature has done, suggests an attachment to exactly
that vision of law as uniquely authoritative that attention to textuality is
meant to put in question. These investments and attachments are of great
cultural interest because they implicate questions of what we want or can
envision law to be, of how we see the role of law as distinct-and we seem
to want it to be distinct-from other social institutions. But these questions
are, alas, not the ones the law-and-literature enterprise has considered.
In summary, what has kept law and literature, and "law and" more
generally, from having the impact that they otherwise might have had in the
legal academy has been insufficient thoughtfulness about interdisciplinarity.
Like other "law ands," the law-and-literature enterprise purports to connect
two disciplinary domains, but it has not questioned how those domains are
defined and bounded. It has thus missed opportunities to raise and address
important questions that would seem central to the "law and" project, that
is, questions about how we distinguish "legal" from other sorts of
knowledge and about our cultural investment in viewing law as an
autonomous discipline.
B. Law, Literature, and Lawyers
Law and literature may not in fact be significantly interdisciplinary in
the senses I have explained. But to practicing lawyers, law and literature
appears all too interdisciplinary in the sense of being law admixed with
something else that is clearly not law. If law is autonomous in the ways in
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which law-and-literature scholars inadvertently suggest, that is, if practicing
law consists of the dry and technical manipulation of rules, then of what
relevance is literature (or anything else) to lawyers?
American lawyers' enchantment with doctrine is evident on many
fronts. It is a prominent theme in recent debates over whether the legal
academy has lost touch with and become irrelevant to the real world of
practice. In these debates, the world of practice is almost always defined as
the world of doctrine." 7 Further evidence of the profession's fixation on
rules comes from law-and-society scholars, who have tried to assess why
empiricism has made so little headway in American legal education. These
scholars have concluded that the answer lies in the extent to which lawyers
and even law professors see "the main business of doing law" as "doing
rules." 118
There are some noteworthy ironies to practitioners' views of law and
literature as irrelevant. From the start, proponents of law and literature have
argued that literature is important precisely because its lessons are practical.
As early as 1908, for example, Wigmore argued that lawyers should read
legal novels because "the lawyer must know human nature." And,
Wigmore asserted, "for this learning... he must go to fiction, which is the
gallery of life's portraits." 119
Narrative law-and-lits have argued for storytelling in similarly
instrumental terms. Lawyers must persuade, the narrativists point out, and
one of the most effective forms of persuasion is storytelling; therefore, they
argue, effective lawyers must learn to be effective tellers of tales."12 Finally,
the theories offered by hermeneutic law-and-lits can be seen as useful
"strategies" for a task lawyers are regularly called upon to perform: the
interpretation of writings such as statutes and documents.12 ,
117. See Edwards, supra note 1, at 42-57 (criticizing the legal academy as insufficiently
attentive to and respectful of doctrine). Judge Edwards' article provoked a raft of responses. See,
e.g., Symposium: Legal Education, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1921 (1993). The persistent fascination with
this issue (and with citation counting) is reflected in Michael J. Saks et al., Is There a Growing
Gap Among Law, Law Practice, and Legal Scholarship?: A Systematic Comparison of Law
Review Articles One Generation Apart, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 353 (1996).
118. JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE
255 (1995); see also Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV.
763, 774-75 (1986) (arguing that the law-and-society movement has not caught on in American
law schools because it stresses what is happening in society, whereas lawyers are interested only
in what is "inside" the legal system).
119. Wigmore, supra note 4, at 579. This sentiment is by no means outdated. See Hirshman,
supra note 16, at 198 ("Legal education should harvest literature ... for literature's insights into
the human condition.").
120. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2429-31 (1989) (describing some of the conditions necessary
for stories to persuade effectively); L6pez, supra note 25, at 2-3 (arguing that lawyering means
problem-solving; that problem-solving can involve trying to persuade others to do what we want
them to do; and that "[t]o solve a problem through persuasion of another, we therefore must
understand and manipulate the stock stories the other person uses").
121. See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 22, at 115, 126.
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Why is it that lawyers do not believe that these very practical aspects of
literature relate to what they do? One possibility is that lawyers and law-
and-lits are talking past each other, failing to engage on the issue of what
"practical" lawyering is. This problem connects to a second irony, which is
that law-and-literature scholarship may reinforce lawyers' narrow vision of
practice as rules even as it seeks to challenge and expand that vision.
Although the law-and-literature enterprise laments the dry doctrinalism of
law, it repeatedly depicts currently practiced law as basically the
application of rules. Such depictions, again parasitic on the standard story
of the rise of law as an independent discipline, may actually help construct
exactly the doctrinalist practices they are meant to disrupt. Cause and effect
here is obviously complicated, but it may be that lawyers can only be told a
certain number of times that what they are doing, however misguidedly, is
mechanically applying rules before they come to believe that applying rules
is essential to the practice of law. Indeed, the more lawyers adopt this view,
the more difficult it may be to convince them that there is "practical" value
to anything else.
II. CONCLUSION: "LAW AND" INSIDE OUT
What is "inside" law and what is "outside"? This is an essential
question for all "law and" endeavors, for it is only what law does not
already include that needs to be added. The idea of "law and" almost
requires "law and" scholars generally, and law-and-literature scholars
particularly, to treat law as a bounded entity, an independent domain. It is
only if there is a divide between law and other disciplines that law can be
connected to those disciplines through some sort of "and" relationship.
Thus, the independence of law from other disciplines is what creates the
possibility of interdisciplinarity.
The possibility of an "and" bridge between law and other disciplines
has been, to some, a source of great hope. Each "law and" movement holds
out a promise to bring new light to bear on old legal questions in ways that
will, the claims variously assert, promote social justice, force a rethinking
of objectivity, humanize legal practitioners, add moral or historical
dimensions to jurisprudence, and so forth. Law and literature, in all its
diverse and perhaps inconsistent strands, is no exception. Literature and
literary methods will, it has been argued, enrich, instruct, enlighten, and
correct law.
But what is this "law" entity that literature will supplement? In a move
characteristic of "law and" work, much law-and-literature scholarship
elides this question altogether, relying sometimes tacitly and sometimes
explicitly on a standard story of how law developed as a distinct and expert
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profession. In this story, law distinguished itself by discarding its humanist,
literary element, leaving a domain consisting almost entirely of rules.
And here is a final irony. For much of the American legal academy, this
domain is functionally empty. Many have grown skeptical of legal
doctrine's capacity to solve legal problems in a convincing way.1
Arguments about legal rules have been shown to fall into predictable
patterns, with rule encountering counterrule or exception, policy
encountering competing policy, text encountering legislative history, and so
forth." The rules are "in" there, all right, but they do not seem to be doing
much to determine the outcome of cases.
If law's territory is a desert, the "law ands" can pour no end of water
on it, but little will bloom. There is not much hope for interdisciplinarity
and all that it promises if one of the disciplines is just not there. Like the
proponents of other "law ands," the law-and-lits have a remarkable
interest, then, in finding some substance in law, in law being a separate
discipline that literature (or some other discipline that is not itself law) can
somehow enlighten.
I do not in fact mean to suggest that the field "law" was created or
constructed entirely by the needs of the "law and" endeavor-although I
realize that what I have said could be interpreted in that manner. On the
other hand, I do not believe law has determinate boundaries that
comparisons with literature (or history or philosophy or economics)
neutrally discover. I believe that the definition of the field "law," like that
of any other field, will to some degree reflect or be a product of what we, as
a culture, want law to be and do. 24 The greatest promise of "law and" lies
in exploring these cultural aspirations, but it cannot deliver on this promise
if it takes law's boundaries for granted.
122. While this position is today associated with Critical Legal Studies, it originated with the
legal realists. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUtM. L. REv. 809, 820-21 (1935). On Critical Legal Studies, see MARK KELMAN, A GuIDE TO
CRrTICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); and Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards:
Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984).
123. See, e.g., James Boyle, The Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1003, 1051-60
(1985); Laura E. Little, Characterization and Legal Discourse, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 372, 383-92
(1996); Jeremy Paul, The Politics of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1779, 1786 (1991).
124. Cf Guyora Binder and Robert Weisberg, Cultural Criticism of Law, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1149, 1152 (1997) (suggesting a similar conception of law).
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